ENVIRONMENTAL

LAW-PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE-STATE
OWNERSHIP OF PUBLIC TRUST LANDS INCLUDES ALL LAND
SUBJECT TO THE INFLUENCE OF THE TIDE-Phillips Petroleum

Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988).
It has long been recognized that certain lands, including rivers, seas and shores exist for the public use.' To ensure that the
public's right of access to these lands is protected, a doctrine has
evolved within the United States forbidding alienation of such
lands to private property owners. 2 Known as the public trust
doctrine, this policy has protected the public's interests in coastal
lands beneath tidewaters, as well as inland soils beneath navigable waters.' In a recent decision, the United States Supreme
Court expanded the doctrine to encompass all tidally influenced
lands, including those which are neither navigable-in-fact, 4 nor
border on any navigable body of water. 5 In Phillips Petroleum Company v. Mississippi,6 the Court declared that each state, upon enI MacGrady, The Navigability Concept in the Civil and Common Law: HistoricalDevelopment, Current Importance, and Some Doctrines That Don't Hold Water, 3 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 511, 513 (1975). The Roman Society is generally credited with first having
created a distinction between private and public waters. Id. at 517. According to
the Roman system of classification, waters which were public included those running "in the rivers, the sea and its shores." Id. (quoting R. POTHIER, TRAITE Du
DROIT DE PROPRIETE (circa 1762), translatedin Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519,
525 (1895)). After the fall of the Roman Empire, elements of its public water system surfaced in the legal codes of many Western European countries, including
Spain, France and England. See MacGrady, supra, at 544-45.
2 The evolution of America's public trust doctrine is directly traceable to English common law, although scholars disagree as to the scope of the common law
with respect to public trust lands. See MacGrady, supra note 1, at 547-68. For a
further discussion of the public trust doctrine see infra notes 28-38 and accompanying text.
The first American case to discuss the concept of lands to be held in trust for
use by all the public was Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. I (Sup. Ct. 1821). In Arnold, the
New Jersey Supreme Court announced that the English common law concept of
royal ownership of certain waters and the lands under them, for the use of citizens,
had transferred upon the Revolution to the citizens of New Jersey. Id. at 76-77.
3 Since 1842, the Supreme Court has recognized the public interest in coastal
lands beneath tide waters. See Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842). Not
until 1877, however, did the Court determine that the American public also had an
interest in navigable inland waters and the lands beneath them. See Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1877). See also infra notes 66-74 and accompanying text.
4 Water is navigable-in-fact if it is "being used in its natural and ordinary condition as a highway for commerce over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water." BLACK'S LAw
DICTIONARY 1329 (5th ed. 1979).
5 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 791, 795 (1988).
6 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988).
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tering the Union, received title to all lands beneath waters
subject to the ebb and flow of the tide.7
In 1973, the Mississippi Legislature enacted the Coastal
Wetlands Protection Law for the purpose of preserving the
state's wetlands.' To facilitate this objective, the Mississippi
Marine Resources Council (MMRC) was charged with the task of
surveying and preparing maps that would enable it to monitor
activities occurring on those wetlands. 9 Accordingly, the MMRC
viewed aerial photographs of coastal lands and drew maps outlining the boundaries of the wetland areas.' 0
The MMRC cautioned that the maps were imprecise and,
therefore, should be used only for the purpose of assisting in regulating areas within the probable scope of state wetlands." Despite these warnings, the Mineral Lease Commission
(Commission) treated the maps as establishing the legal parameters of state-owned property.12 Speculating that valuable gas and
oil resources might be hidden under some of the wetlands, the
Commission began selling leases based on the maps. 13 In 1977,
the Commission sold to Saga Petroleum U.S., Inc. a 600 acre gas
and oil lease situated near the Gulf of Mexico.' 4 Record title to
this property had been vested in the Cinque Bambini Partnership
7 Id. at 799.
8 Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 49-27-1 to -65 (Supp. 1988). The Mississippi Legislature
defines "coastal wetlands" as "all publicly owned lands subject to the ebb and flow
of the tide; which are below the watermark of ordinary high tide." Id. § 49-27-5(a).
9 Id. § 49-27-65; see also Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So.2d 508,
511 (Miss. 1986), aff'd sub nom. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 791
(1988).
1o Cinque Bambini, 491 So.2d at 511. The supervisor of this law testified that
members of the MMRC took maps prepared by the Gulf Regional Planning Commission and "eyeballed" them to determine which areas should be classified as wetlands. Id. He further acknowledged that no surveys had been taken nor any total
data collected or used in drawing the maps. See Cinque Bambini Partnership v.
State, No. 14,178, 3288, 3301 (Miss. Ch. Ct. 1982), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 491
So.2d 501 (Miss. 1986), aff'd sub nom. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S.
Ct. 791 (1988).
11 Cinque Bambini, 491 So.2d at 511. The supervisor maintained that he had
never represented that the maps were an accurate guideline to the state owned
lands. Id. He stated that the MMRC had used them only for jurisdictional purposes. See Cinque Bambini, No. 14,178 at 3301.
12 Cinque Bambini, No. 14,178 at 3301. The supervisor of the Coastal Wetlands
Protection Law claimed that he told the Mineral Lease Commission not to use these
maps for title purposes. Id. He stated that contrary to his warnings, the Commission relied on the "eyeballed" wetlands maps for leasing. Id. at 3302.
'3 Cinque Bambini, 491 So.2d at 511.
14 Id.
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(Cinque Bambini). 15
Upon learning of the Commission's actions, Cinque Bambini
instituted suit in the Chancery Court of Hancock County, Mississippi to confirm title to 2,400 acres of land, including the 600
acre tract subject to the gas and oil lease. 16 Cinque Bambini alleged that in accordance with the public trust doctrine, the state
only held title to lands beneath water which is navigable-in-fact. 17
Cinque Bambini asserted that since none of the lands in question
met this description, the state had acted outside the scope of its
authority.' 8 In response, the co-defendants, State of Mississippi
and Saga Petroleum U.S., Inc., contended that the state owned
all lands under waters subject to tidal influence.' 9
In an unreported opinion, the chancery court found that the
140 acres of disputed land were subject to the ebb and flow of
the tide, and were therefore part of the public trust lands of Mississippi.2 0 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed
in part and reversed in part,2 ' determining that 98 of the 140
acres were man-made lakes, and thus not part of the public
2
trust. 2 2

The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari,

1

15 Id. Cinque Bambini traced its title to pre-statehood Spanish land grants dating back over 150 years. Id. The lands were granted to Cinque Bambini's predecessors in title on April 15, 1813. Id. The grants were confirmed by acts of
Congress. See Cinque Bambini, No. 14,178 at 3298. Since 1813, these landowners
had paid taxes on and quietly enjoyed the wetlands at issue. Id. Not until the Mineral Lease Commission's actions in 1977 was the validity of the landowners' titles
ever questioned. See Cinque Bambini, 491 So.2d at 511.
16 Brief of Respondents State of Mississippi at 6, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988) (No. 86-870) [hereinafter Respondent's Brief].
17 Respondent's Brief, supra note 16, at 28-29.
18 See Cinque Bambini, No. 14,178 at 3291.
19 Id. at 3290-91.
20 See id. at 3322-23.
21 Cinque Bambini, 491 So.2d at 521-22.
22 Id. at 510, 520. The Supreme Court of Mississippi noted, however, that the
lower court was correct in determining that the scope of the public trust doctrine
extended to all tidally influenced lands. Id. at 510-11. The court held that the state
was entitled to all tidally influenced land below "today's mean high water mark."
Id. at 511.
The court further noted that 98 of the 140 acres of tidelands had been artificially created by dredging in the mid-1960s to obtain fill material used for construction of a highway running through the property. Id. at 510. The court determined
these lakes to be "avulsions," which it defined as "a change in a boundary body of
water so rapid or sudden, or in such a short time, that the change is directly perceptible or measurably visible at the time of its progress." Id. at 520 (citations omitted). Since avulsions are not part of the public trust, the court noted, the 98 acres
of man-made lakes were necessarily excluded from the state's trust. Id.
23 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 107 S. Ct. 1284 (1987). After the deci-
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and affirmed the decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court.24
Adopting the reasoning of Mississippi's highest court, the
Supreme Court held that each state, upon entering the Union,
was given ownership of all property subject to the ebb and flow
of the tide. 25 Thus, the Court determined that title to the land in
question was vested in the State of Mississippi as land held in
public trust, 26 regardless of whether the waters under which it lay
were navigable-in-fact.27
At common law, the king was vested with proprietorship
over all Crown lands within his domain.28 This proprietary right
was subject to the public's interest in navigable waters and the
soils beneath them. 2 ' Title to these lands was therefore held by
the English Crown in trust for the public's use.30 Although the
sion by the Supreme Court of Mississippi, the Phillips Petroleum Company replaced the Cinque Bambini Partnership as petitioner. See id.
24 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988).
25 Id. at 799.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11 (1894).

What is now referred to as the
public trust doctrine actually has its origins in Roman law. The Romans divided
public property into three classifications: that owned by no one (res nullius), that
owned by the state or public (res publicae), and that public property owned by all
men in common (res communes). See MacGrady, supra note 1, at 606. Included in this
concept of common ownership (res communes) were the rivers, sea and shore. See
Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68
MICH. L. REV. 473, 475 (1970). The state was responsible for protecting all the
common property for public use. Id. This notion of the common ownership of the
rivers, sea and shore, coupled with the state's duty of protecting these properties,
was eventually adopted in England. See id.
29 See M. HALE, DE JURE MARLS ET BRACHIORUM EJUSDEM cap. IV (circa 1667)
[hereinafter DE JURE MARIS], reprintedin S. MOORE, A HISTORY OF THE FORESHORE
AND THE LAW RELATING THERETO 404 (3d ed. 1888) [hereinafter S. MOORE]. The
king's proprietary right was termed thejus privatum, while the public's interest was
referred to as thejus publicum. S. MOORE, supra, at 404.
Lord Hale noted "[b]ut though the king is the owner of (the seas and the
creeks and the arms thereof), and as a consequent of his propriety hath the primary
right of fishing in the sea and the creeks and the arm thereof; yet the common
people of England have regularly a liberty of fishing in the sea or creeks or arms
thereof, as a public common of piscary, and may not without injury to their right be
restrained of it." S. MOORE, supra, at 404-05.
30 S. MOORE, supra note 29, at 405. Hale's DEJURE MARLS is the primary authority upon which all American courts have relied in determining the scope of the
common law with respect to the public trust. See, e.g., Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1,
11 (1894) ("The great authority in the law of England upon this subject is Lord
Chief Justice Hale .... "); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 412 (1842)
(citing Hale for proposition that king held land for public use).
Although Hale's work has received high acclaim, it has recently been sharply
criticized as creating, rather than stating, the common law. See MacGrady, supra
note 1, at 609. A strong argument to this effect is made by MacGrady, wherein the
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king could relinquish title to these properties, such grants were
nonetheless subject to the public's right, of fishing, navigation,
and commerce. 3 ' In accordance with a classic common law treatise, the public's right extended to "the sea and arms thereof...
where the sea flows and reflows." 32
By virtue of discovery, 3 the king's right of proprietorship
over all tidelands, subject to the public's interest, was extended
to the colonies. 34 At the time of the Revolution, title to these
lands was assumed by the states, as incidental to their new-found
sovereignty. 35 Like their common law counterpart, the states
held title to tidelands in trust for the public uses of fishing and
navigation.36 Thus, a doctrine emerged in the states similar to
the common law concept of a public interest in certain properties. 37 The development of this rule, now referred to as the public trust doctrine, may be traced from a series of cases beginning
in 1842 with Martin v. Waddell.3 8

In Martin, the original case in United States Supreme Court
public trust jurisprudence, the Court was called upon to deterauthor contends that the notion of royal tidelands ownership was not judicially inspired, but rather invented by Thomas Digges, and advanced by Lord Hale. Id.
Regardless of its accuracy, DEJURE MARIS is the foundation upon which the American public trust doctrine has been formed. The Court, in Phillips Petroleum, upon
realizing the intense disagreement as to the actual state of the common law, maintained that "we will not now enter the debate on what the English law was with
respect to the land under [tidal non-navigable] waters, for it is perfectly clear how
this Court understood the common law of royal ownership." Phillips Petroleum, 108
S. Ct. at 796 (emphasis in original).
31 Lord Hale is credited with the "prima facie" theory: the king is the prima
facie owner of thejus privatum in the arms and creeks of the sea. S. MOORE, supra
note 29, at xxxi. The only means by which this prima facie presumption could be
rebutted would be on a showing of an express grant from the king, or by prescription. Id. This theory is also looked upon with skepticism by some scholars. See id.
(arguing that despite an absence of express grants, tidelands ownership could not
be deemed to be prima facie held by the Crown). The Court in Martin v. Waddell,
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842), in speaking of the king's power to grant away portions
of soil covered by navigable waters, noted that "[t]he question is not free from
doubt, and the authorities referred to in the English books cannot perhaps be altogether reconciled." Id. at 410.
32 S. MOORE, supra note 29, at 378.
33 The King proclaimed that since his subjects had discovered these new lands,
title to them became vested in the Crown. Id. at 374.
34 Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 595-96 (1823).
35 Martin, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 410-11.
36 Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 381 (1891) (citations omitted).
37 See, e.g., Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 78 (Sup. Ct. 1821) ("[U]pon the Revolution, all these royal rights became vested in the people of NewJersey as the sovereign
of the country, and are now in their hands .... ).
38 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842). See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894) for a
general discussion of the early public trust cases.
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mine the ownership of certain land covered by the waters of the
Raritan River in Perth Amboy, New Jersey.3 9 At issue was
whether the riparian proprietor or the State of New Jersey held
title to the submerged lands.40 The proprietor alleged that his
rights were supreme, since his grants were from the Crown in
fee, 4 and such grants were paramount to any state claims. 42 After reviewing the language of the grants conveyed by King
Charles II and his successors in title, the trial court held that the
proprietor had received deeds in fee simple for the lands in question.4 s In reaching its conclusion, the Court noted that title had
been conveyed to the proprietor by the king before the Revolution.4 4 Therefore, the Court reasoned, such title had already
been divested from the king when the Revolution took place, and
it could not have transferred to the United States at the time of
the Revolution. 45 The king's prior transfer of the land in fee precluded the subsequent grant made to Martin. 46
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed.47
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Taney first noted that at
common law, lands under navigable waters were held by the king
in trust for the public. 48 The Court thus determined that the es39 Martin, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 407. The land in question was situated in the
Raritan River and bay, below high-water mark, "where the tide ebbs and flows." Id.
at 407.
40 See id. at 411. The riparian proprietor was actually twenty-four proprietors
who held under conveyances from Sir George Carteret and Lord Berkley. Id. at
376. The Duke of York had conveyed the land by indenture to Berkley and Carteret in 1664, and he purported to sell to the proprietors in 1682 any rights which
he held in the property. See id. at 374, 377.
41 See id. at 369-7 1. In 1664, King Charles II granted to his brother, the Duke of
York, a large amount of property, including lands beneath the Raritan River. Id. at
369-70. Through succeeding conveyances, the Duke's proprietors of East Jersey
became vested with the territory in the grant. Id. at 376. The proprietors transferred the premises in question to Waddell's predecessors in title before surrendering all of the authority and privileges given them to Queen Anne of England in
1702. Id. at 407-08, 415.
42 See id. at 407-08. The lessee of Waddell claimed to have exclusive oyster fishing rights to the section of the river in controversy, based on grants traceable to the
English Crown. See id. at 369-74. To the contrary, Martin and others claimed that
exclusive rights were vested in them under color of grants issued by the state in
1824. Id. at 408. The lessee of Waddell therefore brought an action of ejectment
to recover the land and exclusive oystering rights. Id. at 369-80.
43 See id. at 374-80.
44 See id. at 380.
45 See id. at 374-79.
46

47

Id.
Id. at 418.

4h d. at 411. ChiefJustice Taney cited no authority for this proposition. However, in another portion of the opinion he mentioned with approval a New Jersey
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tate in question was passed by Charles II in the same condition
that it had been held by the Crown, in trust for the common
use.49 Therefore, no title in fee could have been transferred. 50
Chief Justice Taney stated that at the end of the American
Revolution, the citizens of each of the states supplanted the king
as sovereign, and in this new capacity took the same dominion
which the king had possessed.5 ' The Court concluded that because the state, in its sovereign capacity, had subsequently
granted the land to Martin and others, those grants were controlling. 5 2 The Supreme Court thereby established the public trust

doctrine, holding the states to be sovereign owners of "all their
navigable waters and the soils under them for their own common
53
use ....
The principles expounded in Martin were applicable only to
the thirteen original colonies.54 Several years later, however, in
Pollard'sLessee v. Hagan,55 the Court considered whether the public trust doctrine should extend to all new states upon their entrance to the Union.5" In Pollard'sLessee, the plaintiff claimed title
to certain tidelands in Alabama,57 based on a congressional grant
issued to him in 1836, seventeen years after Alabama had become a state. 58 Rejecting the plaintiff's claims, the trial court
held that Congress had no right by 1836 to convey title to tidelands which had rightfully vested in Alabama upon its entering
statehood in 1819. 5 9 After the Supreme Court of Alabama upSupreme Court case, Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821). Martin, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.)
at 417. It is quite evident that Chief Justice Taney drew this proposition almost
verbatim from the Arnold opinion, which noted:
[B]y the common law of England .... the navigable rivers in which the
tide ebbs and flows, the ports, the bays, the coasts of the sea, including
both the water and the land under the water ...are common to all the
citizens, and that.., the property.., is vested in the sovereign .... for
the use of the citizen .... for his direct and immediate enjoyment.

Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 76-77.
49 Martin, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 413.
50 See id.

51 See id. at 410.
52 See id. at 417-18.
5 Id. at 410. This proposition also seems to be adopted directly from the Arnold
opinion. See supra note 37.
54 See Martin, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 410.
55 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
56 Id. at 220-21.
57 See id. at 219. The "tidelands" at issue had actually been reclaimed by 1824,
and were the site of streets and buildings. Id. at 232 (Catron, J., dissenting).
58 Id. at 219. Alabama entered statehood on December 14, 1819. Id. at 234
(Catron, J., dissenting).
5 See id. at 219-21. The Pollard case actually involved a title dispute. Id. at 220.
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held the decision of the lower court,6 ° Pollard appealed to the
United States Supreme Court. 6 '
The Supreme Court adjudged that upon entrance to the
Union, Alabama took title to all lands below the high-water mark
of navigable watercourses.62 Because the state assumed such title
in its sovereign capacity, the majority asserted, Congress lacked
the authority to subsequently convey title to any such lands.63
The Court expressed that, insofar as the federal government held
possession of the lands under navigable waters in any territory, it
did so temporarily, until that territory was formed into a state. 64
To maintain "equal footing" with the original thirteen states, the
Court concluded, each state that entered the Union must receive
rights in public trust lands "to the same extent, in all respects" as
those held by the original states. 65
Although the Court had determined that title to navigable
waters and the soils beneath them was vested in each of the
states, the Court failed to delineate exactly what lands were to be
included within the public trust. In Barney v. Keokuk, 66 the
Supreme Court resolved some of the confusion surrounding the
scope of the doctrine. 67 The Barney Court confronted the issue of
whether a private landowner or the State of Iowa owned lands
below the high-water mark of a non-tidal, navigable portion of
the Mississippi River.68
The defendant, Hagan, asserted his right to the lands based on valid grants issued
by Spain prior to its transfer of the land to America in 1803. Id. at 219-20. The
Court failed to address the validity of Hagan's claim, yet it affirmed the ruling of the
lower court in his favor. See id. at 230.
60 Id. at 220.
61 Id.
62 See id. at 220-21.
63 Id. at 221-23.
64 See id. at 221.
65 See id. at 222-23. The "equal footing" language is believed to have its foundation in the Ordinance of Congress ofJuly 13, 1787, as applicable to the Northwest
Territory. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894).
66 94 U.S. 324 (1876).
67 See id. at 339.
68 See id. at 336. Actually, the city of Keokuk had reclaimed lands below the
high-water mark of the river, upon which it built a wharf and levee. Id. at 325. The
city asserted that it had acted under the authority of the state, and that its actions
were done to advance a public purpose, in compliance with the public trust doctrine. See id. at 333-34. The plaintiff, however, claimed that as a riparian landowner, he was properly vested with title. Id. at 325.
In rejecting the plaintiff's argument, the Court determined that each state,
based on its inherent sovereignty, may transfer title to public trust lands if its legislature so decides. See id. at 338. It should be noted that a marginal inroad was later
placed on the power of a state to freely deed away its public trust property. See
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The Court acknowledged that at common law, the terms
"navigable" and "tide-water" had been used interchangeably because all rivers in England which were navigable were also tidewaters. 69 The Court observed that the topography of America
includes many rivers and lakes which are navigable but not tidally
influenced.7 ° Thus, the application of this mixed terminology to
the American public trust lands was deemed inappropriate by the
Barney Court. 7 ' The purpose behind the trust doctrine, the Court
stated, was to preserve "the great passageways of commerce and
navigation, to be exercised for the public advantage and convenience."' 72 Since the Supreme Court had formerly recognized that
navigable waters were amenable to admiralty jurisdiction, 73 it
found no reason why the navigability test could not be applied
for public trust purposes to America's rivers and lakes. 7 ' The
Barney Court thus extended the public trust doctrine to include
all waters which were non-tidal, but were nevertheless
navigable.75
After Barney instituted the navigability concept into public
trust law, the question arose as to whether the navigability test
served to extend public trust jurisdiction to include non-tidal waters, or to completely replace it for all waters, tidal or non-tidal.76
In the case of Shively v. Bowlby,7 7 considered the "seminal case in
American public trust jurisprudence, ' 78 the Court determined
that the navigability test merely extended the scope of the public
trust, instead of replacing it.7 9 In Shively, the Court considered
Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). Although limited to the
facts of that case, the Illinois Central Court implied that in order for a transfer of
trust property to be valid, it must have the effect of benefitting the public without
substantially impairing the public's interest in the remaining lands. See id. at 45053.
69 Barney, 94 U.S. at 338.
70 Id.
71 See id.
72 Id.
73 See The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 457

(1851) (extending admiralty jurisdiction to inland, non-tidal waters).
74 Barney, 94 U.S. at 338-39.
75 Id. See also Oregon State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S.
363, 374-75 (1977) (Barney Court's decision consistent with earlier extension of
admiralty jurisdiction to non-tidal but navigable waters).
76 See, e.g., Knight v. U.S. Land Assoc., 142 U.S. 161 (1891); McGilvra v. Ross,
215 U.S. 70 (1909).
77 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
78 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 791, 793-94 (quoting Reply
Brief for Petitioners at 11, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 791
(1988) (No. 86-870)).
79 See Shively, 152 U.S. at 57.
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whether title to tidally influenced lands below the high-water
mark of the Columbia River in Oregon vested in a pre-statehood
grantee from the federal government or a property owner taking
by virtue of state authority."s After canvassing the common law,
prior Supreme Court holdings and state case law, the Court held
in favor of the title holder taking under the authority of the
state.8 '
In reaching its conclusion, the Court declared that because
the states derived title to all tidelands within their jurisdiction,
the disposition of any lands subject to the ebb and flow of the
tide was properly governed not by federal dictates, but by the
laws of the particular state.82 In so holding, the Shively Court
clearly reaffirmed the position that the public trust doctrine included not only navigable portions of watercourses but also any
83
lands "flowed by the tide.

More recently, the Court reevaluated the scope and applicability of the public trust doctrine in Oregon State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand and Gravel Co. s4 Corvallis concerned the issue of

whether state or federal common law should govern in determining the ownership of a navigable river and the underlying bed, as
between a corporation and the state.85 Holding that the law of
the state is preeminent with respect to possession and disposition
of trust lands, the Court denoted that each state was rightfully
vested with absolute title to all public trust lands situated within
the state 6 upon entrance to the Union. 87 The Supreme Court
Id. at 9. The land in question lay under tidal, navigable water. See id. at 8-9.
81 Id. at 57. The Court stated:
80

By the law of the State of Oregon, therefore, as enacted by its legislature and declared by its highest court, the title in the lands in controversy is in the defendants in error; and, upon the principles recognized
and affirmed by a uniform series of recent decisions of this court, above
referred to, the law of Oregon governs the case.
Id.

82 See id. at 57-58. The Court pointed out that in accordance with its holding in
Barney, states also took title to all navigable, non-tidal waters within their boundaries. See id. at 41-42.
83 Id. at 57.
84 429 U.S. 363 (1977).
85 See id. at 365. In reaching its decision, the Court overruled its previous holding in Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973), which held that federal
common law should control in deciding this kind of title dispute. Corvallis, 429 U.S.
at 382.
86 Corvallis, 429 U.S. at 370 (citing Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.)
212 (1845)).
87 Id. at 370-71

(citations omitted).
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confirmed the principle that each state took title to tidelands.,,
Moreover, the Court stated that by virtue of the extension of
public trust precepts, states also have complete dominion and authority over navigable waters, whether inland or tidal.8 9 The
holding in Corvallis thus affirmed the legitimacy and viability of a
including
state's ownership of all tidal and navigable waterways,
90
the lands beneath them, within its boundaries.
The Corvallis Court confirmed the long-standing principles
upon which the American public trust doctrine is grounded. Because the vitality of the early Court holdings had become so well
entrenched in public trust jurisprudence, the scope of the doctrine appeared to be well settled as including tidelands and nontidal but navigable watercourses. 9t Against this backdrop of presumably well-defined principles, the Court in Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Mississippi,92 recently addressed whether the public trust doctrine was actually intended to encompass all tidal lands, even
those which are not navigable-in-fact. 93
At the outset, the Court framed the issue as whether title to
land underlying non-navigable, tidally influenced waters vested
in the State of Mississippi upon its entrance to the Union in
1817. 9" Writing for the majority, Justice White began by emphasizing the importance of the Court's prior holding in Shively to all
subsequent public trust issues. 95

The Court credited Shively for recognizing that at common
law, the king held title to all tidally flowed lands for the nation's
benefit, and that this sovereignty over tidelands was transferred
to the original states at the time of the Revolution.96 Quoting
Shively, the Court confirmed that tideland ownership passed to
each new state admitted to the Union.9 7 Justice White reiterated
See id. The Court reasoned that:
Although federal law may fix the initial boundary line between fast lands
and the riverbeds at the time of a State's admission to the Union, the
State's title to the riverbed vests absolutely as of the time of its admission and is not subject to later defeasance by operation of any doctrine
of federal common law.
Id. (citations omitted).
89 Id. at 374 (citing Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338 (1876)).
90 See id. at 375 (citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57-58 (1894)).
91 Id.
92 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988).
93 Phillips Petroleum, 108 S. Ct. at 793.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 793-94.
96 Id. at 794 (quoting Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894)).
97 Id. (quoting Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894)). The Court thus reaf88
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that not only Shively, but also its predecessors and progeny
clearly stand for the proposition that a state's sovereignty extends to all lands under tidal waters.9 8
Citing the abundance of case law supporting state ownership
of all tidelands, the Court found Mississippi's claim that this
property was within its dominion quite reasonable. 99 The Court
observed that other states considered all tidally influenced lands
to be within their jurisdiction.10 These states indicated in briefs
supporting Mississippi that use of the navigability-in-fact test to
determine tidelands ownership would be disruptive of many title
deeds settled according to the ebb and flow standard.' 0 '
Justice White indicated that petitioners, Phillips Petroleum,
incorporated early state cases to demonstrate that the thirteen
original states made no claim to non-navigable tidewaters. 10 2
The Justice explained that each state possesses the inherent sovereign power to delineate the bounds of property it chooses to
include or exclude from the public trust. 10 3 To exemplify this
precept, the Court alluded to Mississippi cases, and interpreted
them as expansively defining the state's public trust to encompass all tidewater lands. 10 4 The majority afforded little weight to
firmed its holding in Pollard relating to the equal footing doctrine. See id. See supra
notes 55-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of Pollard.
98 Id. at 794 n.2 (citing Borax Consolidated Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 15
(1935); Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 381 (1926); Illinois Cent. R.R.
Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892); Knight v. United States Land Assoc., 142
U.S. 161, 183 (1891); Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 381 (1891); McCready v.
Virginia, 94 U.S. (4 Otto) 391, 394 (1877); Weber v. Harbor Comm'r, 85 U.S. (18
Wall) 57, 65 (1873); Goodtitle v. Kibbe, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 471, 477-78 (1850)).
99 Phillips Petroleum, 108 S. Ct. at 794.
100 Id. at 794 n.3. See, e.g., Wright v. Seymor, 69 Cal. 122, 123-27, 10 P. 323, 32526 (1886) (holding State of California to be owner of the bed of the Russian River,
even where it was not navigable, since it was affected by the tide); State v. Pinkney,
22 S. C. 484, 507-09 (1885) ("salt marshes" were in public ownership); Simons v.
French, 25 Conn. 346, 353-53 (1856) (tidal flats adjoined by an arm of the sea to be
in public ownership).
10 Phillips Petroleum, 108 S. Ct. at 794. The states supporting Mississippi's use of
the ebb and flow test for determining tidal rights included all of the coastal states,
in addition, to the thirteen original states. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Thirteen
Original States: New York, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Rhode IslandJoined by the Coastal States Organization in Support
of Respondents, at 3-5, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988)
(No. 86-870).
102 Id. (citing Brief for Petitioners at 23-29, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi,
108 S. Ct. 791 (1988) (No. 86-870)).
103 Id. (citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894)).
104 Id. at 798 n.ll (citing Rice v. Stewart, 184 Miss. 202, 230, 184 So. 44, 49
(1938); Martin v. O'Brien, 34 Miss. 21, 36 (1857)).
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the persuasiveness of the petitioner's cited authorities for, as it
pointed out, those cases all originated in states which had chosen
to grant more 05
rights to private property owners than required by
common law. 1
Continuing, the majority reflected upon prior Supreme
Court holdings that sustained state interests in lands submerged
beneath tidewaters unrelated to navigation.1 06 The Court called
attention to several of those uses, such as fishing, 10 7 restricting
the planting and harvesting of oysters, 0 and reclaiming land for
urban expansion, 10 9 before dismissing the contention that the
primary purpose of entrusting land to the state for public use is
the protection of commerce." 0 Justice White perceived that it
would be an oddity for the Court to recognize a variety of states'
interests in public trust lands, only to circumscribe such uses by
confining the public trust to lands navigable-in-fact."'
The
Supreme Court consequently reaffirmed its well-settled principle
vesting states such as Mississippi with title to "all lands under
waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide."' 1 2 Accordingly,
the majority upheld the Mississippi Supreme Court's decision
which determined that title to any lands "under tide waters," be1
came vested in the state upon its admittance to the Union. 3
The majority next addressed the two reasons averred by the
petitioner as to why the broad "tide" language set forth in prior
holdings should be interpreted differently from its more obvious
association. 4 Initially, though, Justice White spurned the assertion of the petitioner that "tidelands" refers only to shorelands
105 Id. at 794-95; see e.g., Groton v. Hurlburg, 22 Conn. 178, 185 (1852); Wethersfield v. Humphrey, 20 Conn. 218, 227 (1850) (holding that erecting a highway
over tidally influenced creeks which were not commercially navigable, did not offend federal control over waters which were navigable).
106 See Phillips Petroleum, 108 S. Ct. at 795 (citing Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 37 1,
381-82 (1891); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. (4 Otto) 391, 395-97 (1877); Den v.
Jersey Co., 56 U.S. (15 How.) 426, 432 (1854)).
107 Id. (citing Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71, 75 (1855)).
108 Id. (citing McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. (4 Otto) 391, 395-97 (1877)).
109 Id. (citing Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 381-82 (1891); Den v. Jersey Co.,
56 U.S. (15 How.) 426, 432 (1854)).
110 See id. at 795 n.5. This directly rejected Justice O'Connor's assertion that,
"[blecause the fundamental purpose of the public trust is to protect commerce, the
scope of the public trust should parallel the scope of federal admiralty jurisdiction." Id. at 801 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
I Id. at 795.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 795-96.
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or tidal lands directly adjacent to the sea." 5 Instead, the Court
adopted what it considered to be the appropriate definition,
which it described as land "over which6 the tide ebbs and flows
....

'
land as is affected by the tide." "1

The first of Phillips Petroleum's two claims, the Court noted,
focused upon what the petitioner considered to be an oddity of
England's topography."t 7 More specifically, the majority referred
to the petitioner's contention that because in England almost all
navigable rivers were also tidal, common law courts frequently
interchanged the term "tidewater" for "navigability."" ' , As explained by the Court, the petitioner fashioned an argument suggesting the sovereign's ownership of lands submerged beneath
tidewaters rested not on the tidal ebb and flow, but on the
water's navigability. 1 9 While acknowledging Supreme Court
precedent signalling that it was the soils beneath navigable waters that were held at common law by the king,12 0 Justice White
distinguished the instant case, noting that the cases relied upon
by the petitioners did not involve tidal, non-navigable waters. 121
Moreover, the majority refused to enter the controversial debate
concerning the actual nature of common law Crown ownership of
tidal property; rather, it chose to follow what it perceived as the
Court's historically consistent interpretation of trust law.1 22 This
common law interpretation, the Court reiterated, provided that
each state, upon entering the
Union, became vested with title to
123
all tidally influenced lands.

Rejecting the petitioner's alleged common law navigability
test, the majority thus concluded that the accurate test of public
115 Id. at 795 n.6.
116

Id. (quoting

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

1329 (5th ed. 1979)).

117 Id. at 795-96.

118 Id. at 796 (citing Illinois Cent. R. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 436 (1892);
The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 452 (1851)).
119 Id. The petitioners thus argued for a navigability test as the standard by
which to determine the boundaries of the public trust. Id. The Court, however,
accepted the respondent's argument in favor of the ebb and flow of the tide test.
Id.
120 Id. (citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894)). The petitioners, however, relied on English authorities, including DEJURE MARLS, supra note 29, for the
contention that Crown ownership did not extend to soil beneath non-navigable waters. See Brief for Petitioners at 23-29, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S.
Ct. 791 (1988) (No. 86-870). Furthermore, Phillips Petroleum argued that both
Martin and the Genesee Chiefcases utilized the navigability test as a means of defining
the extent of Crown ownership of lands. Phillips Petroleum, 108 S. Ct. at 796.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id. (citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894)).
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trust lands is the expansive language of Shively and its progeny. ,24
The Court interpreted these cases as determining that public
trust lands include all lands affected by the ebb and flow of the
tide.1 25 Conceding that these cases did not actually concern nonnavigable, tidally influenced lands, the Court nonetheless upheld
their applicability, pointing to the lack of any
contrary opinions
26
retracting or limiting the Shively language.
After rejecting the common law navigability argument, the
Court considered the petitioners' second argument. Phillips Petroleum had asserted that even assuming common law courts
failed to use the navigability test for determining the scope of
trust lands, subsequent Supreme Court holdings had made navigability the "sine qua non of the public trust interest" in America's
tidelands. 27 Justice White first confirmed that the Supreme
Court had extended admiralty jurisdiction beyond waters subject
to the influence of the tide, to include all navigable waters. 28
The majority also recognized that the public trust was likewise
broadened. 29 In the Court's view, however, this alteration did
not serve to withdraw from trust classification those lands historically included within its scope.' 30 Instead, the Court interpreted
this development as an expansion of the doctrine to include not
only those lands subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, but also
all navigable lakes and rivers.' 3 ' Because the trust had been exSee id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443,
456-57 (1851)).
129 Id. at 797 (citing Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435-36
(1892); Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. (4 Otto) 324, 338 (1876)).
130 Id. By so holding, the Court rejected the petitioners' belief that "navigability
is or was the prevailing test for state dominion over tidelands." Id.
131 Id. (citing Oregon State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S.
363, 374 (1977)). The Corvallis Court interpreted the holding in Barney as "extend[ing] the [public trust] doctrine to waters which were nontidal but nonetheless
navigable, consistent with [the Court's] earlier extension of admiralty jurisdiction."
Oregon State Land Bd. v. Corvallis, 429 U.S. 363, 374 (1977).
To support its position, the Phillips Petroleum majority cited Mann v. Tacoma
Land Co., 153 U.S. 273 (1894), which was decided shortly after the extension of the
public trust rule. Phillips Petroleum, 108 S. Ct. at 797 n.8. After determining that
Mann involved lands under non-navigable tidal waters, the Court noted that the
lands were ultimately held to be within the scope of the trust. Id.
The Court noted the similarities between Mann and the case at bar, but stated
that the Mann Court made no reference to the fact that the lands in question were
beneath non-navigable waters. Id. But see Reply Brief for Petitioners at 15-16, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988) (No. 86-870) (asserting that
124
125
126
127
128
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tended rather than replaced by the navigability test, the Court
32
concluded, it declined to accept the petitioners' argument.1
After concluding that the ebb and flow test remained valid,
the Court considered whether the public trust includes the nonnavigable portions of tidewaters which border on the "oceans,
bays, and estuaries."'' 3 3 The Court rationalized that the ebb and
flow test required that those lands be included in the public
trust. 1 34 Although the majority admitted to a distinction between
the waters at issue and non-navigable waters on the edge of the
shore, it countered that the difference was only one in degree,
and not in kind.' 3 5 Because all tidewaters are, in the end, connected to the sea, Justice White reasoned, the petitioners' distinction was ineffectual. 3 6 The Court determined that since the
lands in question possessed the same "geographical, chemical,
and environmental" characteristics shared by all tidelands, they
must be a part of the public trust.1 3 7 Based on the ebb and flow
test, the Court articulated that the lands in question were a part
of the public trust, and title to them had therefore vested in the
State of Mississippi upon its entrance to the Union in 1817.138
The Court next considered the reasonable expectations of
property owners. 139 While recognizing the general principle that
the expectations of property owners should be maintained, Justice White posited that in the instant case, the petitioners' expectations were not reasonable. 40 Justice White noted that
the land in Mann was located on the shores of a navigable waterway and therefore
rightfully within the scope of the public trust). Petitioners denied what the Phillips
Petroleum Court eventually professed, that the land at issue in Mann was tidal but
non-navigable, since the only reference to this effect is found within the argument
of counsel, not the Court's opinion. See Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra, at 15-16.
132 Phillips Petroleum, 108 S.Ct. at 797.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 See id.
137 Id. at 797-98 (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 183 (1979)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
The Phillips Petroleum majority also criticized the test proposed by the petitioners which would include only lands underlying or bordering on navigable bodies of
water. Id. at 798. Instead, the majority pronounced its support for the ebb and
flow standard because of that test's jurisprudential support and practical application. Id. In particular, the Court noted that "the ebb and flow rule has the benefit
of 'uniformity and certainty and . . .eas[e] of application.'" Id. at 798 (quoting
Cobb v. Davenport, 32 N.J.L. 369, 379 (Sup. Ct. 1867)).
138 Id. In so doing, the Court affirmed the decision of the Mississippi Supreme
Court. Id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
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although the petitioners had paid taxes on the property for more
than a century, Mississippi courts had consistently announced
"title to all the land under tidewater" was vested in the state.' 4 1
While holding that the state courts' pronouncements applied to
all tidewaters, the Court acknowledged that Mississippi had never
before directly considered lands which were tidal but non-navigable in character. 14 2 Because the state of Mississippi had repeatedly endorsed uses of public trust lands unrelated to
navigability,' 4 3 the Court reasoned that the petitioners were on
sufficient notice that the state's claim to all tidelands
was not con1 44
fined to lands underlying navigable waterways.
The majority rejected the suggestion that its ruling would
have an adverse effect, either within Mississippi or on a national
scale. 145 Particularly, the Court reiterated that each state has
handled its public trust rule as it has seen fit. 14 6 Justice White
resolved that the Court's holding would not alter the law of any
state which had
already relinquished its claim to tidally influ47
enced lands.'
Conversely, the majority discerned, to validate the navigability test would be to upset settled expectations, because of the
many land titles which had been previously adjudicated by the
ebb and flow standard.' 48 The Court noted that some states had
preserved the public's use of tidelands even after giving dominion of such property away to private landowners, and then indicated that these long-standing rights might well be jeopardized
were the Court to uphold a navigability rule for determining tidelands ownership. 14 9 Returning to the expectations of the private
landowners in the instant matter, the Court repeated that the petitioners' long history of paying taxes and being the record title
holders of the tidelands still could not equitably vest them with
title.' 50 According to the majority, this was due to the Mississippi
141 Id. (quoting Rouse v. Saucier's Heirs, 140 So. 291, 292 (Miss. 1933)).
142

Id.

143 Id. (citing Treuting v. Bridge and Park Comm'n, 199 So.2d 627, 632-33 (Miss.

1967)).
144 Id.
145 Id. This suggestion was taken from the dissent, wherein Justice O'Connor
stated, "[t]he Court's decision departs from our precedents, and I fear that it may
permit grave injustice to be done to innocent property holders in coastal states."
Id. at 805 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
146 Id. at 798.
147 Id. at 799.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150

Id.
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Supreme Court's determination that neither laches, adverse possession, nor any similar equitable doctrine could cause the state
to be divested of its ownership.' 5 ' Since Mississippi never forfeited claim to its lands subject to the ebb and flow of the tide,
the Court concluded, the decision
of the Supreme Court of Mis152
sissippi must be affirmed.

Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Stevens and Scalia, dissented from the majority's holding, asserting that the Court's
holding disturbed the settled expectations of many landowners
with a conclusion that contravened prior Court determinations. 5 3 Justice O'Connor criticized the majority for achieving
its result by relying on general language from opinions recognizing state ownership of land beneath tidewaters.' 5 4 Justice

O'Connor asserted that those cases concerned waters that were
navigable-in-fact.' 55 According to the dissent, never before had
the Court allowed land beneath a "discrete and wholly non-navigable body of water that is properly viewed as separate from any
navigable body of water" to be included within the public
trust. 15 6 Rather, the dissent argued, the public trust has been re-

peatedly defined by the Court in terms of navigability. 15 7 Conceding that the authorities upon which the dissent relied for this
proposition were all freshwater cases, Justice O'Connor nevertheless maintained that there was no judicial support for the use
of different tests, one for fresh and another for salt water, as a
means of outlining the public trust.'
After reviewing the common law roots of the public trust
doctrine, the dissent stated that no common law courts had reported whether title to non-navigable tidal watercourses was
vested in the sovereign. I" Justice O'Connor indicated, however,
that English common law courts held the public's navigation
151 Id. The Court found no reason to upset the "general proposition [that] the
law of real property is, under our Constitution, left to the individual States to develop and administer." Id. (quoting Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 295
(1967) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
152 Id.

153 Id. at 800 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
'54 Id.
155 Id. Justice O'Connor was referring to the majority's reliance upon Shively,

Mann, and other such cases. Id.
156 Id.

157 Id. (citing Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2318 (1987);
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 551 (1981); Utah v. United States, 403
U.S. 9, 10 (1981); Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 230 (1845)).
158 Id.
159 Id.
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rights to be limited to waterways which were navigable-in-fact, as
opposed
to extending them to all waterways subject to the tidal
60
flow.'

The dissenting Justice posited that since the king's sov-

ereignty did not include land submerged under navigable watercourses unless influenced by the tide, title to lands underlying
tidal waterways might not have been held by the king, unless the
water was navigable.' 6 ' Since no common law cases existed identifying Crown rights in terms of lands beneath navigable waters, 162 the dissent concluded, a strong case existed in support of
the view that the common law 16would not afford sovereign ownership of the lands in question.

Justice O'Connor observed that American courts and their
common law counterparts had consistently maintained that the
trust extends to navigable waters for the fundamental purpose of
preserving commerce and navigation.1' 4 The dissent explained
that although a state in its discretion may allow the trust lands to
be used for other purposes such as fishing and land reclamation,
these uses are merely incidental, and by no means serve to expand the scope of the trust. 165 As the dissent stressed, even the
majority did not claim that the doctrine should be expanded to
include all watercourses which can be used for fishing and land
reclamation. 16 6 However, Justice O'Connor implicitly noted, the
majority rejected the navigability test as a means of determining
which lands are to be part of the public trust since trust lands
have on occasion been used for other purposes. 1 6 7 Justice
O'Connor therefore chastised the majority for failing to explain
why the ebb and flow test is superior to the navigability test for
identifying watercourses fit for such other purposes.' 68 The dissent further asserted that tidality is no longer the proper measur160 Id. at 801 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Mayor of Lynn v. Turner, 1
Cowp. 86, 98 Eng. Rep. 980, 981 (K.B. 1774)).
161 See id.
162 See id. (citing Rex v. Smith, 2 Dougl. 441, 446, 99 Eng. Rep. 283, 285 (K.B.
1780)).
163 Id.
164 Id. The dissent stated, "[i]t is, indeed, the susceptibility to use as highways of
commerce which gives sanction to the public right of control over navigation upon
[navigable waterways], and consequently to the exclusion of private ownership
either of the waters or the soils under them." Id. (quoting Packard v. Bird, 137 U.S.
661, 667 (1891)).
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id. See supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
168 Id.
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ing stick for examining the boundaries of the public trust.1 69 The
dissent argued that soon after being abandoned for the purposes
of admiralty jurisdiction, 170 the ebb and flow test likewise ceased
to be a part of public trust jurisprudence.' 7' Justice O'Connor
further rationalized that although the Supreme Court cases declining to use the ebb and flow rule all concerned inland waters,
the same reasoning was nonetheless applicable to tidally influenced waters.' 72 The dissent reasoned that the primary purpose
for which the public trust exists, to protect commerce and navigation for the public, 73 dictates that navigability is the essential
element for characterizing lands fit for public trust use, regard1 74
less of whether they are inland or coastal.
Justice O'Connor pronounced that congressional legislation
also supported a conclusion that the public trust is defined in
terms of navigability. 75 Referring to the Submerged Lands
Act,' 76 the dissent insisted that since the Act had defined lands
submerged below navigable waters to include land "covered by
tidal waters," if one were to include discrete, non-navigable bodies of water in the term "tidal waters," then a contradiction
would obviously exist. 17 7 Based on this potential inconsistency,
the dissent deduced, Congress evidently understood "tide waters" to mean the boundaries of the navigable sea.' 78 Acknowledging that although the Act was not at issue in the case before
the Court, Justice O'Connor reasoned that it nonetheless deserved consideration as demonstrating Congress' understanding
Id.
Id. at 801-02 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting The Propeller Genesee
Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 457 (1851)).
171 Phillips Petroleum, 108 S. Ct. at 801 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Accord McGilvra
v. Ross, 215 U.S. 70, 78 (1909) (tidal test "had no place in American jurisprudence
since the decision in the case of The PropellerGenesee Chief ....
); Barney v. Keokuk,
94 U.S. 324, 338 (1876) ("[T]he public authorities ought to have entire control of
the great passageways of commerce and navigation, to be exercised for the public
advantage and convenience."); The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall) 557, 563 (1870)
("the ebb and flow of the tide do not constitute the usual test, as in England, or any
test at all of the navigability of waters").
172 Phillips Petroleum, 108 S. Ct. at 802 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
173 Id. at 801-02 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. (4
Otto) 324, 338 (1877)).
174 Id. at 802 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
175 Id. (citing Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1982 & Supp. IV
1986)).
176 Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
177 Phillips Petroleum, 108 S. Ct. at 802 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting 43
r;.s.c. § 1301(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
169
170

17H /&
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Justice O'Connor then explained the existence of tidewater
language in public trust cases.' 0 Since the shores of navigable
bodies of water have always been included within the public
trust, the dissent postulated, there is authority for describing the
test in terms of tidal waters.' 8 ' In the dissent's view, though, the
inclusion of non-navigable shorelands, up to the mean high tide
line, by no means implied that all tidally influenced watercourses
should also be included as part of the trust. 8 2 Justice O'Connor
thus criticized the majority for construing not only non-navigable
shorelands, but also discrete bodies of water as components of
the trust. 83 Such a standard, the dissent continued, wrongfully
included the separate small streams and bayous in question,
which, although tidally influenced, are far removed from any navigable tidal water. 8 4
Further, the dissent criticized the majority for declining to
make a distinction between the two types of tidal waters, since
the resulting test would include even the most remote of waters,
if somehow connected to the sea.' 85 This broad rule, the dissent
continued, was entirely inconsistent with the standard utilized for
inland waters, which does not afford public trust status to all
parts of a river simply because they might be somehow contiguous with a navigable section. 18 6 Hence, the dissent concluded,
the appropriate test is the one used for inland waters: "[o]nly
waterways that are8 7part of a navigable body of water belong to
1
the public trust."'

In concluding, Justice O'Connor turned to the particulars of
the case at bar, emphasizing that Mississippi's oil and gas leasing
extended far beyond the traditional uses of the public trust.188
179

Id.

180 See id.

181 Id.at 802. As an example, Justice O'Connor applied this concept to the
ocean. Since the borders of the navigable ocean "extend to the mean high tide line
as a matter of federal common law," Justice O'Connor denoted, the public trust
includes shorelands where the tide ebbs and flows, thus explaining the existence of
"tide" terminology in public trust case law. Id.(citing Borax Consol. Ltd. v. Los
Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 16 (1935); United States v. Mission Rock Co., 189 U.S. 391,
484-85 (1903); Knight v. United States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161, 183 (1891)).
182 Id. at 802-03 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
183 See id.at 803 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id.
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Justice O'Connor criticized the majority's holding, not only for
approving a "radical expansion" of the use of trust lands, but
also for upsetting the reasonable expectations of thousands of
landowners in coastal states. 8 9 The dissent warned that the
Court's holding would encourage state actions like those taken in
New Jersey, where the state was arbitrarily and without compensation taking title to all tidelands away from private landowners.1 9° Justice O'Connor found little solace in the Court's
postulation that state law might protect the equitable claims of
landowners owning tidal property.' 9 1 Instead, the dissent
charged that when the potential for profit is involved, the landowners' interests will fall by the wayside under color of Supreme
92
Court authority. 1
The genesis of the modern confusion surrounding the scope
of the public trust doctrine stems from the common law principle
that in England, tidality was synonymous with navigability. Faced
with the juxtaposition of these terms, the early Supreme Court
93
used both words interchangeably in discussing the doctrine.
The Phillips Petroleum Court, lacking any clear jurisprudent support in favor of one standard over the other, was forced to resolve whether sovereignty was meant to extend to all lands
subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, or only lands submerged
beneath navigable waters. The majority chose to interpret the
broad statements from cases like Shively as the primary authority
for delineating the boundaries of the public trust. 194 Close scruId. at 804 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
190 Id. Justice O'Connor quoted from a SETON HALL LAW REVIEW article, wherein
the authors noted:
Due to this attempted expansion of the [public trust] doctrine, hundreds
of properties in NewJersey have been taken and used for state purposes
without compensating the record owners or lien holders; prior homeowners of many years are being threatened with loss of title; prior grants
and state deeds are being ignored; properties are being arbitrarily
claimed and conveyed by the State to persons other than the record
owners; and hundreds of cases remain pending and untried before the
189

state courts ....

Porro & Teleky, Marshland Title Dilemma: A Tidal Phenomenon, 3 SETON HALL L. REV.
323, 325-26 (1972) (footnotes omitted). The dissent noted that these problems
still exist within the State of New Jersey. Phillips Petroleum, 108 S. Ct. at 804
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
191 Id. See supra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
192 Id. at 804-05 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
193 Compare Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 413-14 (1842) ("the navigable waters of England, and the soils under them, held by the Crown" at common
law) with Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894) ("The new States ... have the
same rights . . . in the tide waters, and in the lands under them.").
194 See Phillips Petroleum, 108 S. Ct. at 794-96.
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tiny of the majority's reasoning in support of the expansive ebb
and flow language, however, reveals that it is not nearly as solid a
position as the majority suggests.
The Court utilized language from cases such as Shively to
support the proposition that at common law, title to "lands
flowed by the tide water" were vested in the king, and that after
the Revolution, each state took the same rights "in tide waters,
and in the lands under them."' 9 5 Without examining the meaning of "tidelands" in those cases, however, the Court concluded
that "tidelands" encompassed every inch of land influenced by
the tide's ebb and flow.
Particularly distressing was the Court's refusal to afford full
consideration to the legal framework surrounding the doctrine,
especially since this was admittedly the first time the Supreme
Court considered the ownership of lands beneath non-navigable,
tidally influenced waters. Just as the Court had failed to look into
the meaning of "tidewaters" as it was used in earlier cases, the
Court also refused to consider what the common law was with
respect to tidewaters, for as it remarked, "it is perfectly clear how
this Court understood the common law of royal ownership
....
"196 The Court must therefore be faulted for refusing to
investigate the accuracy of the prior holdings with respect to the
true nature of the common law.
Had the majority looked beyond the face of the broad language of Shively to the historical and stated purpose of the trust,
it would have been confronted with a persuasive contention that
navigability is the true sine qua non of the public trust. The
Supreme Court has consistently stated that the trust exists for the
purposes of "commerce and navigation, to be exercised for the
public advantage and convenience."'' 9 7 In fact, the Court in
Shively noted the purposes of the trust to be "commerce, navigation, and fishery.' ' 98 The traditional purposes thus indicate that
the navigability of the water, as opposed to the ebb and flow of
the tide, is most closely related to the true nature for which the
public trust was created.
Perhaps to preempt this argument, the majority stressed that
prior holdings have recognized uses for trust lands which do not
concern navigability, including land reclamation for urban ex195 Shively, 152 U.S. at 57.
196

Phillips Petroleum, 108 S. Ct. at 796.

197 Barney, 94 U.S. at 338.
198

Shively, 152 U.S. at 57.
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pansion, and oyster harvesting. 19 9 The majority therefore reasoned that navigability could not possibly be the determinative
test for the scope of the public trust. The Court, however, confused the supplemental uses of the public trust with its traditional
purpose. To the contrary, such additional uses are permitted at
the discretion of the state, and are merely incidental to the primary function of the public trust. By no means should the incidental uses be construed as expanding the physical borders of
the trust. Because property may be fit for fishing, oyster harvesting or land reclamation does not necessarily qualify it for public
trust coverage, but such is the logical implication of the majority's reasoning.
Another shortcoming of the majority's holding is the manner
in which it disregards the petitioners' arguments in opposition to
the stance ultimately endorsed by the Court. Justice White distinguished the authorities cited by the petitioners in support of a
navigability rule because the cases "did not deal with tidal, nonnavigable waters. ' 2 0
Immediately thereafter, however, the
Court reinforced the ebb and flow rule with cases that were conceded to not actually concern lands such as those involved in this
case. 20 ' If the persuasiveness of the one argument is diminished
or nullified for not devolving from the issue of non-navigable,
tidally influenced land ownership, then the Court's conclusions
must similarly be erroneous.
In reaching its conclusion, the Phillips Petroleum Court denied
that there were different kinds of tidelands. To concede as much
would weigh in favor of the petitioners' argument that the term
"tidewaters" does not necessarily refer to all lands subject to the
tide's ebb and flow. Hence, the Court admitted that there was "a
difference in degree between the waters in this case, and non-2
20
navigable waters on the seashore that are affected by the tide.
The Court emphasized, however, that the difference was only
one of degree, and not of kind, because "in the end, all tidewaters are connected to the sea."' 20 3 Again, the logic of the majority
must be questioned. Based on the Court's reasoning, one might
conclude that rivers, streams and lakes, regardless of their navi199 Hardin v.Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 381-82 (1891); Phillips Petroleum, 108 S.Ct. at
795 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71, 75 (1855)).
200 Id. at 796.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 797.
203 Id.
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gability, are just a varying degree of the public trust lands since,
in the end, they are connected to the sea.
Moreover, the Court criticized as inconsistent the petitioners' concession to state ownership of tidelands bordering bays,
oceans and estuaries, even if such waters were not navigable.2" 4
Such a position, however, is not inconsistent with a navigability
test, since tidelands which border navigable waters have always
been considered a part of the public trust. 20

5

As the PollardCourt

noted, lands subject to the ebb and flow of the tide are part of the
public trust precisely because they constitute "shores of navigable waters. ' ' 2

6

The Phillips Petroleum Court failed to reconcile

how lands which are not only non-navigable, but also discrete,
not bordering on any navigable body of water, could possibly
serve the purposes for which tidelands were entrusted to the king
and subsequently the states: for the purposes of commerce and
navigation, to7 be exercised for the advantage and convenience of
the public.

20

The Phillips Petroleum Court warned that to decide in favor of
the navigability test would upset settled expectations. 20 8 Nonetheless, the Court neglected to indicate how it could upset a
state's expectations if the state had never before determined
ownership of non-navigable, tidally influenced lands. Additionally, one must ask how a state's expectations would be upset.
While it is true that small non-navigable streams and drainage
ditches influenced by the tide's ebb and flow would not be a part
of the trust lands, the boundaries of the trust would be otherwise
relatively unaffected. Certainly, the public would not be losing
its access to the beaches or its right to navigate, for the navigability test includes tidelands which border on navigable waters, regardless of whether they themselves are navigable.2 0 9 Hence, the
only tidelands not included in the trust would be those which are
discrete, non-navigable, and not bordering on any navigable watercourses. Excluded from the public trust would be small
streams like those in Phillips Petroleum which traverse private upid.
See, e.g., Massachusetts v. New York, 271 U.S. 65, 92-93 (1926) ("seashore"
belongs to the public since it provides "access to the sea"); Baker v. Moran Bros.
Co., 153 U.S. 287, 288-289 (1894) (public title to tidal lands allowed because lands
usable "in facilitating approach to the navigable waters from the upland").
206 Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 230 (1845).
207 See Shively, 152 U.S. at 57.
208 Phillips Petroleum, 108 S. Ct. at 796.
204 See
205

209

Id. at 798.
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land properties, and which are outside the true scope of the public trust doctrine. The Court's holding, however, will upset
expectations of thousands of property owners (not to mention
the insurers) in every coastal state, who reasonably believed that
they held lawful title to certain tidally influenced lands. 210

In

light of the Phillips Petroleum holding, many states will now have
the capability to take back property they once trusted away, as
long as they can find or create a legal loophole to justify their
actions.2 1 1
Still, one might contend that the public does have an interest
in the marshes, meadowlands, and small streams that would be
excluded from a public trust measured by the navigability standard. If the Supreme Court's goal in validating the expansive
reading of "tidelands" was to protect the wetlands for ecological
and environmental reasons, then its motives were truly admirable.2 12 This goal, however, could have been achieved without
subjecting all tidally influenced lands to a public trust, and upsetting the settled expectations of many.
Through legislation, for instance, the states or even federal
government could create a servitude such as a public easement.
These easements would afford the public access rights to such
properties for fishing, swimming, nature study or any other public interest. As the majority acknowledged, tidelands in some
states are privately owned, but the public's right to use such
property for purposes like hunting, fishing and bathing has long
been protected. 2 3 Additionally, legislation could be passed
prohibiting the development or exploitation of any wetlands.
Legislation of this nature would not only protect the environment, but also prevent private landowners from being dispossessed of the titles which they reasonably believe to be their own.
The protection of the environment, however, does not appear to be the guiding force behind the Court's decision. Indeed, the majority's holding allowed the State of Mississippi to
exploit the small tidal streams in question by leasing them out for
oil and gas exploration under the guise that any profits derived
would benefit the public. Whatever its motivations, the full effects of the Court's holding in PhillipsPetroleum remain to be seen.
210 High Court Extends States' Rights to Tidelands Miles from the Ocean, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 24, 1988, at A16, col. 3.
211 Id.
212 It is anticipated that the ruling will help some states to protect their environmentally sensitive tidelands. Id. at A16, col: 1.
213 Phillips Petroleum, 108 S. Ct. at 799 n.12.
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For now, though, many landowners must stand by to see whether
the non-navigable, tidally influenced lands which they have quietly enjoyed will be reclaimed by the state for the "benefit of the
public."
John Edward Bruder

